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A GREAT WRIT WHILE IT LASTED
ROBERT WEISBERG*
This is a brief essay on the emergence of an esoteric legal doc-
trine, or, more precisely, on the confluence of several legal doc-
trines. It is also a brief snapshot of how the Supreme Court hopes,
or believes, that some of its esoteric doctrines of criminal procedure
and jurisdiction can play a role in the amorphous social campaign to
fight violent crime in America. The essential point is this: in a pair
of decisions handed down this Term,' the Supreme Court substan-
tially eviscerated federal habeas corpus jurisdiction as an instrument
for constitutional law. And though we know no motives for
Supreme Court cases other than those announced in the decisions,
one can speculate that the Court was simply frustrated with the in-
adequacy of the execution rate of America's death row inmates.
I. AN EARLY HINT FROM JUSTICE REHNQUIST
A. FOILING FEDERAL HABEAS
The story might begin a decade ago. In the 1980 case of Cole-
man v. Balkcom,2 surely one of the most remarkable sets of memoran-
dum opinions ever written, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
signaled a new, more aggressive phase in his campaign against what
he perceived to be two closely related phenomena in our post-War-
ren Court society: the rise of violent crime- indeed of homicidal
chaos-and the abuse of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by those
who commit violent crime. In Justice Rehnquist's view, the Great
Writ, so far from acting as an instrument to protect the innocent
from prosecutorial oppression, had become the tool with which
criminals obstructed society from punishing them with finality.
Coleman was, in legal terms, a relatively routine death penalty
case that arrived at the Court from the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Convicted of a brutal murder of six members of a family, Coleman
lost on direct appeal in the Georgia courts and on his first certiorari
* Professor of Law, Stanford University.
1 Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
2 451 U.S. 949 (1980) (denial of certiorari).
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petition to the United States Supreme Court; he then lost again on
state habeas in Georgia, so he was on his second round of certiorari,
though he had not yet entered federal habeas corpus.3 The claim
itself was unremarkable. Coleman argued that he had been wrongly
denied a change of venue claim based on prejudicial publicity.
More precisely, he claimed that a combination of two Georgia stat-
utes barred him from subpoenaing the witnesses he needed to prove
that claim on collateral review in Georgia.
4
Ironically, Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to grant certiorari,
not because he thought Coleman had a plausible claim on the mer-
its-quite the opposite-and not because he thought Coleman's
claim presented an important question of law that needed to be re-
solved. Rather, Justice Rehnquist wanted the Court to take the case
on the merits (and, presumably, do the same for an exemplary series
of cases) and summarily affirm the state court decision, thereby vir-
tually ending any hope Coleman might entertain for relief in the
federal courts. 5 Otherwise, injustice Rehnquist's view, if the Court
followed its reasonable inclination to deny certiorari, Coleman
would, like the typical death row inmate, begin clogging the docket
of a federal district court with his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.6
B. THE "GREAT WRIT" AND THE DEATH CASES
Justice Rehnquist's prediction that Coleman, along with other
death row inmates, would clog the dockets of federal district courts
was wholly realistic. For over three decades, state prisoners bene-
fited from an expanded federal habeas corpus jurisdiction that made
the federal trial courts effectively operate as "mini-Supreme
Courts." These courts, armed with an expanding Warren Court
criminal jurisprudence, aggressively scrutinized state criminal con-
victions. In 1953 in Brown v. Allen, 7 the Court virtually mandated its
own lower courts to turn the Great Writ to this new mission. From
the late 1950s until at least 1970, the Warren Court gave state pris-
oners more and more doctrinal weapons under the fourth, fifth,
sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, enabling the federal
courts to find flaws in a wide variety of situations previously immune
3 Id. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 The statutes simultaneously required Coleman to file his state habeas petition in
the county where he was imprisoned- more than 150 miles from the site of his trial-
and barred him from subpoenaing witnesses from more than 150 miles away. Id.
5 Id. at 957.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) (requiring all federal courts to hear habeas corpus cases
brought pursuant to the Constitution or the laws of the United States); Coleman, 451 U.S.
at 957.
7 344 U.S. 443, 460-65 (1953).
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to federal review because the cases were too mundane or too fact-
specific to warrant the attention of the Supreme Court on direct
review.
Moreover, a paradoxically simultaneous legal phenomenon en-
sured an increasing, and increasingly motivated and well-repre-
sented, flood of these litigants: the sequence of death penalty cases
marked by Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia9 made it possible
by the late 1970s for hundreds of death row inmates to seek federal
habeas relief. These litigants were both the most desperate and the
best represented. Thanks to Warren Court doctrines-and, ironi-
cally, even post-Gregg Burger Court doctrines 10-these litigants car-
ried plenty of doctrinal weaponry with them when they entered the
federal courts.
Hence Justice Rehnquist developed his novel strategy: to foil
petitioners like Coleman from flooding the federal trial courts with
federal habeas petitions, the Court should grab the cases on direct
review, affirm them summarily on the merits, and thereby preclude
further appeals through the federal courts. Otherwise, the specter
was that "[i]f petitioner follows the path of many of his predeces-
sors, he will now turn to a single-judge federal habeas court" and
will begin the whole process anew.11 Justice Rehnquist explained,
"Given so many bites at the apple, the odds favor petitioner finding
some court willing to vacate his death sentence because in its view
his trial or sentence was not free from constitutional error."'12
Justice Rehnquist then stated that the confluence of these legal phe-
nomena-expanded habeas review and expanded eighth amend-
ment rights-had created a "stalemate in the administration of
federal constitutional law."' 3 Despite the supposed reinstitution of
the death penalty in Gregg, the existence of the death penalty had
become "virtually an illusion": 14 "Since 1976, hundreds of juries
have sentenced hundreds of persons to death, presumably in the
belief that the death penalty in those circumstances is warranted, yet
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty, as then currently administered, is cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment).
9 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty does not violate eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments in all cases but its constitutionality may rest on new fair procedures).
10 E.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (right to preclude double jeop-
ardy where defendant has won a "life verdict"); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)
(per curiam) (compulsory process right to pro-defense evidence); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (confrontation right to rebut state evidence).




14 Id. at 958.
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virtually nothing happens except endlessly drawn out legal proceed-
ings ... ."15 Justice Rehnquist conceded that the courts want to
avoid becoming a "Bloody Assizes" but argued that the result of this
constitutional squeamishness was a judicial overreaction- "arcane
niceties which parallel the equity court practices described in
Charles Dickens's Bleak House."'
16
In perhaps the most telling part of what might otherwise have
been an obscure essay on statutory jurisdictional rules, Justice
Rehnquist argued that these issues had profound implications for
the problem of violent crime in America. ' 7 He noted that the proce-
dural protractions encouraged by the broad use of section 2254
frustrated the deterrent goals of the modem death penalty.18 More-
over, harking back to the Gregg Court's earlier treatment of retribu-
tional goals as a basis for the death penalty, he argued that these
litigation maneuvers encouraged a counter-force of vigilante vio-
lence in America as well.' 9
San Francisco experienced vigilante justice during the Gold Rush in
the middle part of the last century; the mining towns of Montana ex-
perienced it a short time later; and it is still with us as a result of the
series of unsolved slayings of Negro children in Atlanta .... I believe
we have in our judicial decisions focused so much on controlling the
government that we have lost sight of the equally important objective
of enabling the government to control the governed .... In Atlanta,
we cannot protect our small children at play. In the Nation's Capital,
law enforcement authorities cannot protect the lives of employees of
this very Court who live four blocks from the building in which we sit
and deliberate the constitutionality of capital punishment. 20
C. THE NEW HISTORY OF THE OLD WRIT
Of course, by the time the Coleman case came to the Supreme
Court, the Burger Court had managed to reverse much of the War-
ren Court jurisprudence that, in Justice Rehnquist's view, supplied
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 961-62.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. Justice Rehnquist went on to cite the salutary example of a nineteenth-century
judge, Judge Isaac Parker of the old Western District of Arkansas, who had become
legendary as a "hanging judge" of the Old West and who is reported as saying, "'I
never hanged a man. It is the law.'" Id. at 962 (quotingJ. GREGORY & R. STRICTLAND,
HELL ON THE BORDER 28 (1971)). The life of Judge Parker is apparently one of the
ChiefJustice's scholarly hobbies. In addition to the Gregory & Strictland biography, the
ChiefJustice has cited H. CROY, HE HANGED THEM HIGH 222 (1952), to establish that
Judge Parker's treatment of Indian cases caused the Choctaw tribe to revere him. Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 n.10 (1978).
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the constitutional arguments for these death penalty litigants. The
Court had begun reversing the expansive trend in the interpretation
of the Bill of Rights. 21 Equally important, the Burger Court had
begun reexamining the philosophical basis of the expansion of fed-
eral habeas corpus begun in Brown.22 The Court had begun treating
section 2254 not as the basis of a constitutional entitlement, but
rather as a technical statutory device that was subject to pragmatic
instrumental analysis. Its discussion of the writ shifted from the
rhetoric of grandiloquent constitutional idealism to the less compel-
ling rhetoric of crime control, bureaucratic monitoring, and plead-
ing rules. The Court inferred that Congress did not want the writ to
be used or abused beyond certain highly specific practical goals.23
In that regard, two crucial limitations on habeas corpus
emerged in the 1970s. The first was what we might call the "sub-
stantive" approach. If one galling legacy of the Warren Court most
exacerbated the problem of state prisoners drowning the federal
courts with federal claims, it was the complex progeny of Mapp v.
Ohio.24 Fourth amendment claims became, in the Burger Court's
view, the paradigm of the most suspect class of constitutional
claims-those that had no legitimate bearing on the role of state
trial courts in separating the guilty from the innocent.
After a halting effort in 1973,25 three years later the Court
handed down Stone v. Powell,26 virtually announcing the end of all
federal habeas corpus relief for fourth amendment claims. 27 Two
crucial things need to be noted about Stone. First, though limited to
fourth amendment claims, it left hints that search-and-seizure issues
were merely emblematic of the larger relevant category of cases to
be carved out of section 2254-those not bearing on factual guilt
and innocence. 28 In short, Stone suggested that there might be a
21 E.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at lineups only applies
after start of formal proceedings); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (Miranda
right does not apply when prosecution seeks to introduce defendant's statements for
impeachment).
22 For a description of Brown, see supra text accompanying note 7.
23 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying fourth amendment exclusionary rule to state
courts).
25 Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-75 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring).
26 428 U.S. at 465.
27 Stone allows federal habeas petitions on fourth amendment issues only when the
state courts wholly deny the defendant an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." Id.
at 491-92 n.31.
28 Stone left temptingly open the possibility that the Court would further exclude
from habeas other types of claims that did not clearly bear on guilt or innocence-most
notably Miranda claims. Of course, determining whether Miranda or coerced confession
claims are procedural claims or claims that tend to establish innocence is not an easy
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hierarchy of constitutional criminal procedure rights. Second, Stone
was the case that introduced into modern habeas jurisprudence the
new, less grandiloquent rhetoric of policy analysis in treating sec-
tion 2254. Federal claims previously viewed by some as virtually de-
ontological in their significance were reduced to instruments of
deterrence of certain forms of state misconduct, instruments whose
value might well be exceeded by their costs in actually destroying
the deterrent effect of state criminal law.
29
The second restriction had to do not with the invocation of the
writ itself but with a particular perceived abuse of it. Numerous
prisoners, having been poorly counseled at trial or having been un-
able to anticipate some of the constitutional innovations of the fed-
eral courts toward the end of the Warren era, would seek federal
habeas relief on claims never pressed or not fully preserved at trial
or on appeal in the state courts. Facing the problem of waiver when
they tried to exercise their entitlements and seek habeas review
under Brown, these prisoners were ultimately able to rely on the wa-
tershed Warren Court case of Fay v. Noia,30 which relieved them of
the penalty of waiver so long as there was no evidence that their
failure to preserve their claim in state courts had been part of a cyni-
cal strategy of "sandbagging." Yet a decade and a half later, the
Court perceived that the problem of sandbagging--deliberately
"throwing the trial" in state courts in order to set up a federalism-
subverting victory under section 2254-had become both so preva-
lent and so insidiously hard for the state to disprove that the burden
of persuasion on this issue had to be shifted in the other direction.3'
The result was Wainwright v. Sykes, 32 under which a state pris-
oner who had failed to preserve a constitutional claim in state court
lost that claim altogether unless he could later meet the exquisitely
obscure test of "cause and prejudice." The "cause" test essentially
meant that the prisoner need show either such a level of lawyerly
incompetence in failing to raise a clear claim that he was better off
matter, and one that, contrary to indications in a Rehnquist footnote in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.l 1 (1977), the Court has avoided so far. For examples of cases
hearing claims on the merits even though the claims did not bear on factual innocence,
see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), and
Grist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
29 Stone, 428 U.S. at 493 (no reason to assume that "any specific disincentive [for
police to violate the fourth amendment] already created by the risk of exclusion... [in
those proceedings] would be enhanced even if there were the further risk that a convic-
tion might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incar-
ceration of the defendant").
30 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
31 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
32 433 U.S. at 72.
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directly characterizing his claim as a sixth amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, or, paradoxically, that his new federal
claim rested on such unforeseeable new constitutional innovations
following his-conviction that not even a wonderful defense lawyer
could have anticipated them.33 As for the "prejudice" part of the
test, Sykes essentially linked itself back to Stone, reminding litigants
that the new jurisprudence of harmless error would discourage
claims that could not be shown to have demonstrably affected the
result of the trial.3 4 Later cases fleshing out this "cause-and-preju-
dice" test made clear that the Court had adopted a miserly view of
the reasonable availability of section 2254.35 Symbolic vindication
of federal rights was not the purpose of federal habeas corpus.
D. DECIPHERING THE LAW OF DEATH
This was the situation in the law of federal habeas corpus at the
time that Justice Rehnquist was expounding on the significance of
the otherwise insignificant Coleman case. At the same time this clash
was emerging between the lagged expansion of federal rights and
the Burger court's jurisdictional restrictions under the statute, an-
other massive change was occurring which, of course, can be laid on
the lap of the Burger Court: the death penalty cases. In the wake of
Furman, and even in the wake of Gregg, death row inmates around
the country were encouraged to pursue a whole newjurisprudence's
worth of federal constitutional claims that the Court had essentially
created for the death penalty-both "substantive" and "proce-
dural" eighth amendment claims. Many of those claims involved
fine-tuning the new forms of statutory regulation which the Gregg
Court essentially required. "Eighth amendment due process" be-
came a new category of constitutional law, and the new legal phe-
33 Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court
Has Work To Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 38-66 (1978); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986).
34 Tague, supra note 33, at 27-34.
35 In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152
(1982), the Court held that the already high costs of liberal allowance of habeas relief
were exacerbated when the petitioner tried to raise a claim he had waived in the state
courts and applied the Sykes cause-and-prejudice test even though the underlying claim
bore on factual innocence. In most cases now, if the "cause" for procedural default is
attributable to an error by counsel, the petitioner will be far better off pleading a viola-
tion of his sixth amendment right to effective representation. See Murray, 477 U.S. at
478. If the cause has to do with the unanticipated novelty of the federal claim, the later
case of Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), left open some opportunity for raising a claim
"so novel that its legal basis [was] not reasonably available"-except that such a novel




nomenon of the "penalty trial" became the medium for creating a
secondary panoply of Warren-Court-derived defendants' rights.
36
Moreover, one other new death penalty doctrine-thanks to its
wonderfully paradoxical plasticity-became another great source of
constitutional doctrine-making. Though Furman and Gregg had
called for stringent new regulation of the death jury's discretion, in
Lockett v. Ohio3 7 the Court engaged in a controversial mid-course
correction. It held that to ensure the tradition of flexible, individu-
alized sentencing (the happier side of the lawless and capricious
sentencing that it was the purpose of Furman and Gregg to prevent)
the states had to continue granting sentencers considerable room to
maneuver in deciding the ad hoc moral propriety of a death sen-
tence-so long as that discretion lay on the side of the defendant.
Denounced as inconsistent with the very premises of Furman and
Gregg,38 Lockett provided defendants with a whole new source of de-
mands that the death penalty jury be properly encouraged, man-
dated, instructed, or liberated to invoke an amorphous range of
moral norms in determining the propriety of death in a particular
case.39
The result was a huge-if temporary-expansion in opportuni-
ties for death row inmates to attack the legality of their death
sentences in such (relatively) friendly courts as those of the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits. And, of course, the death row inmates be-
came the most significant users of the statutory habeas remedy.
They were the most likely to receive skilled, post-conviction repre-
sentation, and they had, needless to say, the greatest incentives to
pursue their claims as long as possible. Most starkly, they were the
ones who most clearly perceived that mere protraction of their liti-
gation, even without great hope of ultimate success, was beneficial.
E. RESTORING THE RESTORATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
It was frustration over these converging forces that sparked Jus-
tice Rehnquist's Coleman opinion. Of course, at that time, it might
have appeared that no one would ever get executed in the United
States. Thus, Justice Stevens, in rebutting Justice Rehnquist, was
moved to point out that the delays and protracted federal habeas
proceedings that bothered his colleague might be the short term re-
sult of the early litigation that accompanied any new criminal
36 See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 338-43.
37 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (eighth amendment right to admission of all mitigating evi-
dence proffered by defense, even if outside statutory categories).
38 Id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39 Weisberg, supra note 36, at 322-28.
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scheme-the phase in which reviewing courts "got the bugs out" of
the system.40 Justice Stevens foresaw that once these bugs had got-
ten worked out, executions would proceed apace. Of course, not
even Justice Stevens wanted to concede the premise of the Rehn-
quist argument-namely, that it was the very goal of the federal
courts to help the state carry out their executions. Justice Stevens
nevertheless took a defensive stance in arguing that the federal
courts were not unduly obstructing the plan for truly restoring capi-
tal punishment in America.
41
Ten years later, whether Justice Stevens's prediction has been
borne out is a matter of point-of-view. Over a hundred executions
have occurred, at a steady but very slow rate.42 Whether enough
executions have occurred to vindicate the perceived public interest
in deterrence and retribution depends on what the observer be-
lieves to be the optimal proportion of executions to sentences.
Some southern states have executed a handful of prisoners a year.
The majority of death penalty states have executed no one.
43
Though the federal judiciary now consists of a majority of appoin-
tees of recent Republican administrations, 44 something inherent in
the procedural and substantive complexity of federal law has kept
the execution rate far lower than the public would seem to prefer.
And perhaps the chief medium for this institutional resistance to
hurrying executions has been the repetitive and prolonged use of
federal habeas corpus.
The courts have played an ambiguous role in this continuing
"stalemate." Though some act as barriers to execution, others have
been trying to lower the barriers. Reversals in eighth amendment
doctrine in both the state and federal courts have limited the range
of claims death row inmates can make.45 The pro-defendant "de-
regulation" wrought by Lockett was followed by a symmetrical dereg-
ulation in favor of the states. Moreover, the Supreme Court
eventually rejected the broadest possible readings of Lockett, the
ones that would have barred the states from telling juries that the
40 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950-51 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in de-
nial of certiorari).
41 Id. at 950-53.
42 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEmA Row, U.S.A. 5 (July
"1989).
43 Id. at 6.
44 Over Half of Federal Judges Now Reagan Appointees, 134 Chicago Daily L. Bull., Oct.
24, 1988, at 1.
45 There is no better state example than the entire set of over 70 death penalty affir-
mances out of 100 cases in the Supreme Court of California after the 1986 electoral
demise of the Rose Bird court, which had affirmed 3 out of 60 death sentences. For a
discussion of federal cases, see Weisberg, supra note 36, at 343-58.
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law virtually dictated death sentences in particular cases, regardless
of the jury's normative impulses. Most significantly, in the case of
McCleskey v. Kemp, 46 the Court eliminated the last truly major struc-
tural attack on the death penalty.
While judicial efforts to discourage multiple or protracted capi-
tal appeals continued, 47 the cause of constraining habeas petitions
in death cases turned to another logical arena-Congress. After all,
section 2254 is a statute, not a constitutional principle, and in its
oversight of federal courts, Congress might well be moved to free
them of the task of reviewing endless federal claims of prisoners
who might well have received their fair share of due process in the
states. Himself a harsh realist about the state of capital punishment
in America, 48 recently retired Justice Powell was appointed by new
ChiefJustice Rehnquist to head a committee that would recommend
to the courts and Congress a new structural solution to the problem.
The Committee's product, an elaborate scheme for trading off a vir-
tual bar to multiple petitions for assurances of true due process in
the states, has met a surprise fate-discussed below as an epilog to
this doctrinal narrative.
4 9
Nevertheless, the federal habeas petitions written by death row
inmates have not stopped, nor could they be expected to, in part for
the simple reason that death row inmates have no incentive to stop
filing them. They have all to gain and nothing to lose. Moreover,
the uncertain boundaries of the surviving Warren Court decisions as
well as the Burger Court death penalty decisions have enabled pris-
oners to identify in their own cases arguably important new points
of constitutional law.
At the same time, our increasingly conservative society has des-
46 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting claim that death penalty was administered in a ra-
cially discriminatory manner in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
47 The Court soon took other (halting) steps to constrict some of the worst perceived
abuses of habeas, especially the use of multiple petitions alleging new legal claims. In
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion), a plurality would have
barred a second petition-based on a claim previously litigated in the state courts but on
which new federal law had intervened-when the claim, involving confessions and the
right to counsel, did not bear on factual innocence. And in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 888-96 (1983), the Court held that the federal circuit courts need not feel bound to
issue stays of execution pending full consideration of the claim on the merits, but rather
can decide the merits summarily upon the application for a stay.
48 In the opinion for the Court in MCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309, Justice Powell was can-
did enough to acknowledge that a major reason for denying the claim of unconstitu-
tional discrimination based on the race of the victim was that the claim logically
implicated analogous discrimination throughout the criminal justice system.
49 For the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases, see 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 143-
51.
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perately sought explanations and scapegoats for the perennial per-
ception that violent crime is out of control. In this light, the new
Rehnquist Court has continued its assault on habeas, and a strange
sequence of new cases in 1989 and 1990 has taken the most forward
step in that regard.
II. TEAGUE: A NEW RULE ON NEW RULES
A. RETROACTIVITY RETURNS
The trigger for the new restrictions lies in a 1989 case, Teague v.
Lane.50 Teague, an Illinois prisoner, raised the issue of habeas in yet
another guise, one that exists somewhat independently of habeas as
well-the question of retroactivity.5' Traditional restrictions on ret-
roactivity have always been plagued by jurisprudential problems.
Courts, especially federal courts imposing their constitutional views
on state courts, face a perennial problem when they find in a partic-
ular case the occasion for announcing a concededly expansive view
of their precedents. They are reluctant to penalize the adverse
party-in this context, a state government-for failing to anticipate
a dramatic change in the law, but, traditionally anxious about cross-
ing the line between law-discovering and law-making, courts are in-
clined, at the very least, to apply a new rule of law in the case in
which it is articulated. 52 The problem especially plagues the United
States Supreme Court because of that Court's paradoxical identity.
On the one hand, it must act like any other appellate court-eschew-
ing advisory opinions, worrying over issues of mootness and ripe-
ness, ensuring that a decision does not exceed its particular factual
context. On the other hand, the combination of the discretionary
certiorari process and the supremacy clause gives the Supreme
Court an essentially advisory task.
The problem of retroactivity, though not limited to cases on
collateral review, arises with special difficulty in that context for the
obvious reason that, at any time, the number of people who might
benefit from a new expansive definition of a federal right and who
ate currently in prison after exhausting their direct appeals exceeds
those who are either still facing trial or on direct review. Given the
complex permutations of retroactivity, before Teague the Supreme
Court had never fully clarified any distinction between direct review
50 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Justice O'Connor's lead opinion in Teague represented a
majority for some parts, but only a four-justice plurality for the key retroactivity
decision.
51 Id. at 1065.
52 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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and collateral review for purposes of retroactivity. In Teague the
Court found the opportunity to do so.
B. SCRAMBLING FOR APPLICABLE LAW
The substantive background case to Teague was the 1986 case
Batson v. Kentucky.53 Batson ruled that the equal protection clause
right to a jury composed of the cross section of the community pro-
hibited the prosecution from using its peremptory challenges to
strike blacks from the jury venire.54 Batson thereby overruled Swain
v. Alabama,55 which had held that to prove a violation of the jury
cross section requirement, the defendant had to prove that the pros-
ecutor had demonstrably removed blacks from juries time after
time, case after case, to the extent that he had perverted the whole
scheme of criminal justice.
56
Teague arguably had a good claim under Batson, but he could
not benefit from Batson because, shortly after Batson was handed
down, the Court had held in Allen v. Hardy57 that Batson could not be
applied retroactively to cases already-like Teague's-on collateral
review. Relying on the old retroactivity standards of Linkletter v.
Walker,58 the case that had rejected the retroactivity of Mapp, the
Court held that Batson constituted an "explicit and substantial break
with prior precedent [sic]" because it overruled part of Swain.59
Under the Linkletter standard, the Court looked to various factors
such as the degree of change from the old rule and the practical
effect retroactivity would have on the adverse party.60 Of course,
the Linkletter standard did not necessarily rely on the distinction be-
tween direct and collateral review, but in Allen, the Court took the
not uncommon approach of holding Batson applicable only to cases
still on direct review and rejecting its application to cases already on
federal habeas.
6 1
53 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54 Id. at 94-95.
55 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
56 Of course, Batson did not hold that a defendant is guaranteed that his particular
petit jury represent a fair cross section. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975) ("[I]n holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative
of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mir-
ror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population.").
57 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986) (per curiam).
58 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
59 Allen, 478 U.S. at 258.
60 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-40.
61 Teague had a minor argument that another decision, McCray v. New York, 461
U.S. 961 (1983), which preceded the finality of his conviction, had itself sufficiently over-
ruled Swain to free him of the constraints of Swain. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060,
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Teague tried to circumvent the problem of non-retroactivity by
arguing that Swain itself supported his claim for reversal, 62 but,
whatever the merits of that claim, he had apparently fatally waived it
under Sykes and, in any event, still had an opportunity to try that
claim again in the state courts. 63 Thus, in his tortuous effort to find
some basis for federal relief, Teague took a rather extreme strategy.
Having been denied relief under the oldest precedent, Swain, and
also having been denied relief under the newer "precedent," Batson,
Teague tried to make himself the medium of the newest possible
doctrine of all. Shifting gears from the equal protection clause to
the sixth amendment jury right, Teague, in the Court's view, now
argued that the right to a jury of his peers applied to the petit jury
and governed his case independently of his fourteenth amendment
equal protection right.64
To the (uncertain) extent that this new claim was that a defend-
ant was entitled to a petit jury that was itself constitutionally cross
sectional, the Court could easily have dealt with the merits, and,
most likely, it would have flatly rejected the claim. And nothing in
what the Court did ultimately say would give any hope to a future
claimant making that argument. But the Court did not (exactly) ad-
dress the merits at all. Rather, it readdressed retroactivity by focus-
ing squarely on the issue of how the distinction between direct and
collateral review affected retroactivity.
65
C. A NEW RULE ON NEW RULES
The Court has usually taken the approach of applying a "new
rule" of criminal procedure to the case at hand, and then later, in a
separate case, confronting the retroactivity issue.66 By the Court's
own concession, 67 the result has been confusion. Some new rules
1067 (1989). McCray was actually a cluster of opinions concurring in and dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, and it merely invited a reexamination of Swain. The Teague
Court rejected this argument on the ground that the denial of certiorari can have no
substantive effect. Id.
62 Teague's argument was that once the prosecutor proffers explanations for his per-
emptory challenges, Swain would permit an examination of those stated reasons just as it
would permit scrutiny of a systemic bias in juror challenges. Id.
63 Id. at 1068.
64 Id. at 1069.
65 Id. at 1071-75. The retroactivity issue was raised by an amicus in Teague, but not
by the parties. Id. at 1069.
66 E.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). But see, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (addressing retroactivity in the same case announcing the new
rule).
67 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070-71.
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have applied only to cases on direct review, 68 others only to defend-
ants in the case at bar,69 and others only to trials which have not
even begun at the time the rule is announced.
70
The Teague decision squarely reversed the Court's normal ap-
proach: when a prisoner proffers an arguably new rule of criminal
procedure, the Court will first hypothesize its granting of the claim
and immediately consider the consequences for retroactivity of
granting it.7 1 Retroactivity is now a threshold, not a secondary
question, and, with tails now wagging dogs, that threshold question
will determine whether the Court reaches the merits at all. The fear
of expansive retroactive effect will now govern whether any judicial
law-making occurs at all.
Teague unraveled itself as follows. First, the Court relied on an
apparently inarguable general principle of retroactivity: even if the
case proposing a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure is on
collateral review, the Court would feel bound to apply the new rule
to the case at hand.72 But another principle intervened-an as-
sumed principle of horizontal equity: if the prisoner raising the
claim on federal habeas is entitled to the benefit of its granting, then
so too would be all those similarly situated prisoners, those also ca-
pable of or in the act of raising it on collateral review.73 Then a
third principle, essentially derived from the now partly irrelevant
Linkletter doctrine, was invoked. If the practical consequences and
harm to the states of applying a new rule to all those prisoners who
are equitably entitled to its benefit would be too great, then the only
logical solution is not to grant the claim at all-at least in a habeas
case. 74
Of course, assumed in all this discussion has been the definition
of a "new rule." Teague suggests a definition: a ruling that "breaks
new ground or imposes new obligations" on the states or on the
federal government.75 Put differently, it is a new rule if it is not
"dictated by precedent" existing at the time the petitioner's convic-
tion became final.7 6 The Court seems unembarrassed at invoking a
distinction that law students soon learn to deconstruct-the concep-
68 E.g., Tehan v. United States x rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
69 E.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
70 The most glaring example has been in post-Miranda cases. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at
1071.
71 Id. at 1078.
72 Id. at 1069.
73 Id. at 1069-70.
74 Id. at 1071-72.
75 Id. at 1070.
76 Id.
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tually impossible distinction .between a ruling that follows inelucta-
bly from precedent and one which concededly expands precedent-
all this in a judicial world where courts rarely acknowledge that they
do any more than draw ineluctable conclusions from precedent.
Under its definition, the Court claimed to have little trouble decid-
ing that Teague's sixth amendment claim indeed would constitute a
new rule.
7 7
The plurality's new approach of categorically distinguishing di-
rect from collateral review purports to solve' the confusion attrib-
uted to Linkletter.78 And the implicit author of this new approach is
Justice Harlan, who, the Court now says, foreshadowed it in opin-
ions never quite adopted by the Court. Himself highly dissatisfied
with Linkletter, Justice Harlan essentially advocated the categorical
distinction between direct and collateral review, 79 and the Court re-
cently invoked, if not fully accepted, the Harlan view in Griffith v.
Kentucky. 80 The Court in Griffith adopted at least one part of the
Harlan idea-rejecting Linkletter where it might have refused retro-
activity even to other cases on direct review.
81
The relevant gist of the Harlan position was that the Court's
focus should not be the abstract issue of retroactivity but rather the
instrumental issue of the purpose of collateral review.8 2 ForJustice
Harlan, federal habeas jurisdiction, however expansive Brown in-
tended it to be, should revert to its most fundamental purposes: to
free state prisoners who had essentially been lawlessly imprisoned,,
that is, who had suffered from state court decisions that had so fla-
grantly violated settled federal law as to constitute virtual plain er-
ror.83 The goal of section 2254 was not to help federal law evolve-
that is what the Supreme Court does on direct review-but to deter
state officials and courts from shamelessly violating the Constitu-
tion.84 And where the Supreme Court did indeed expand the con-
stitutional rights of defendants, the counterbalancing principle of
77 Under recent retroactivity cases like Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 24 (1988), Teague
was unquestionably, in the Court's view, calling for a new rule himself, though Teague
haplessly insisted that his claim was a mere application of Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979). Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 n.l.
78 Id. at 1071-72.
79 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding Batson applies retroactively to all cases on direct
review not yet final when Batson was decided).
81 Gnffith held that the "integrity ofjudicial review" and principles of equity required
that all cases on direct review be treated alike. Id. at 323.
82 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675.
83 Id. at 684.
84 Id. at 685-86.
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repose barred application of the new holding to inmates who had
exhausted their direct appeals.8 5
Justice Harlan, however, insisted on two exceptions to the prin-
ciple of non-retroactivity of new rules to collateral cases. First, a
habeas petitioner might enjoy a new rule if that rule operated to
place "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."
86
Second, the new rule might apply if it involved those procedures so
fundamental that, to quote the elusively concise formula of Justice
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut,87 they " 'are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' "88 The Harlan paradox then was that a rule
could only be invoked on federal habeas to upset the repose of state
convictions if it was so absolutely fundamental-substantively or
procedurally-as to undermine the very premise of state prosecu-
tion in the first place.
Of course, this summary of Justice Harlan's view also glides
over the issue of defining the "new rule" concept. But the Teague
Court simply assumed that Teague was invoking a new rule, since
the part of the Linkletter doctrine that pointed to the direct overrul-
ing of precedent still obtained.8 9 Thus, the Teague Court had only to
consider whether either of the two Harlan exceptions applied. Since
the first exception was unquestionably irrelevant, 90 the Court's only
problem was in parsing the exquisitely paradoxical and vague lan-
guage of Palko to determine the fundamental-ness of Teague's claim
in the pantheon of purported rules of criminal procedure. In one
case, Harlan had taken a somewhat indirect but clarifying approach
to this second exception: the proposed rule would have to be a vir-
tual watershed. 9' Put more bluntly, if the claimed right did not
seem as essential as that of Clarence Gideon, then it was not funda-
mental enough.9 2 If so, the oddity of the Gideon litmus test is that it
requires the claimant to exaggerate his claim-to stretch it to some-
thing so hyperbolic that it would meet the watershed test-though
such a rhetorical maneuver would thereby also probably ensure its
demise on the merits. But another Harlan opinion offered a more
modest, and arguably more precise, notion of a second exception-
one far more consistent with the themes of Burger-Rehnquist Court
85 Id. at 682-83.
86 Id. at 692.
87 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
88 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
89 See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646-47 (1984).
90 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989).
91 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94.
92 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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criminal procedure, from Stone to Sykes: the new rule claimant
would, at the very least, have to demonstrate that the new rule
would be designed to distinguish the factually innocent from the
factually guilty.93 The Teague plurality chose a combination of the
two approaches, 94 and therefore adopted about as stringent a test as
imaginable.
Either way, Teague himself was a loser. If there are any water-
shed cases left, there are few of them, and Teague's somewhat
amorphously identified claim, tied up in hyper-subtle issues of pre-
sumptions and evidence -rules, was not one of them. 95 A ruling in
Teague's favor on the merits might represent a helpful advance on
fair trial rights, but it would lack the grandeur of the classic criminal
procedure cases that established that you cannot drag the defendant
behind the jailhouse and beat a confession out of him, or refuse to
allow him to see a lawyer.96
Of the other opinions in Teague, one bears special notice. Jus-
tice Stevens partly agreed and partly disagreed with the notion of
deciding the retroactivity issue first.97 He applauded the idea that,
reversing Linkletter to some degree, the Court would now treat the
retroactivity issue in the same case that would deal with the claim on
the merits. 98 But for Justice Stevens, the Court had gotten things
backwards: it should first rule on the merits, and then decide retro-
activity, and if this raised the risk of an apparently advisory decision
on the merits, it did so no more than the now-undisputed notion
that the Court could decide an issue on the merits before determin-
ing whether any established error was prejudicial.99 Perhaps more
significantly, Justice Stevens competed with the Court for the
proper legacy of the somewhat elusive Harlan approach-preferring
a reversion to the old Palko test mentioned in one of the Harlan
opinions. 00 But his reason was not a preference for vague rhetori-
93 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94 Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77.
95 See Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32 (1975) (fair cross-section requirement
does "not rest on premise that every criminal trial or any particular trial [is] necessarily
unfair because it [is] not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment").
96 E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). Nevertheless,Justice Stevens's concurrence notes that a claim of racial discrimi-
nation in a death penalty case evokes the fundamental concerns about the criminal jus-
tice system that might merit extraordinary review. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1081 (Stevens,J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).






cal abstractions like "ordered liberty." Rather, it was the very prac-
tical concern, almost completely ignored by the Court, that the
concept of factual innocence was almost wholly inapposite to any
claim governing the penalty phase of capital trial.' 0 ' He would have
therefore tolerated an "exception" based on a more intuitive sense
of fundamental constitutional importance, and would have been in-
clined to find virtually any claim involving racial discrimination to
meet that test.
0 2
D. THE FIRST "OLD RULE" UNDER THE NEW "NEW RULE" RULE
Meanwhile, in the same Term Teague was decided, the Court
had an opportunity to clarify the lingering question in Teague-the
definition of a "new rule." The defense bar was probably decep-
tively heartened by the result. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 10 3 the Court
faced one of the most viscerally vexing questions the death penalty
had forced on it-whether the eighth amendment forbade the exe-
cution of a mentally retarded defendant. A tortured majority in this
Texas case ended up ruling that the defendant's death sentence was
unconstitutional, but it avoided any categorical decision on the
death sentence eligibility of a retarded man.' 0 4 Rather, returning to
the twisted judicial history of the Texas death penalty statute, a ma-
jority ruled that the heart of the Texas scheme, its infamous Ques-
tion No. 2, however well it generally met the demands of Gregg and
Lockett, did not by its terms permit the jury to give the constitution-
ally requisite consideration to the defendant's retardation. 0 5 The
Court thereby broached procedurally what it would not confront
substantively, but the relevant point here is that to even reach that
101 Id. at 1081; see Weisberg, supra note 36, at 346.
102 justice Stevens, of course, recognized that Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986)
(per curiam), was an obstacle to Teague's Batson claim as well as to his sixth amendment
claim, but he took the view that the other basis for Teague's claim-that in Swain itself-
merited a remand to the Illinois courts. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1083 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
104 Various combinations of justices joined in various parts of justice O'Connor's
Penry opinion. A majority agreed that the eighth amendment did not categorically forbid
the execution of a retarded person, while justice O'Connor stood alone in her view that
the execution of Penry could not be supported on the evidence of his mental capacity
presented by this particular record. Id. at 2940.
105 The heart of the Texas scheme was the question asking the penalty jury "whether
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
37.071 (b)(2) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1990). The Court had earlier approved this Texas
statute on the understanding that somehow this question would permit the jury to hear
all proffered mitigating evidence, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), as was later ex-
plicitly required by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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issue, it had to run Penry's claim past the new Teague test.106 Ironi-
cally, had the claim been treated as the categorical one, it might
have been viewed as readily falling into the first Harlan exception,
so that its new rule status would have been no bar to relief.
In any event, the Court then had to decide whether, having am-
bivalently approved the Texas scheme in Gregg's partner case-Jurek
v. Texas107-- and having tolerated it under Lockett, it would be creat-
ing a new rule by granting Penry's claim. Holding in the nega-
tive,' 08 the majority incurred the wrath of Justice Scalia, who was
moved by the Court's decision on this threshold jurisdictional ques-
tion to note, "It is rare that a principle of law as significant as that in
Teague is adopted and gutted in the same Term."' 0 9 Justice Scalia
alone confronted the conceptual finesse the Court had attempted in
distinguishing "dictated" from "merely informed" new decisions:
In a system based on precedent and stare decisis, it is the tradition to
find each decision "inherent" in earlier cases (however well concealed
its presence might have been), and rarely to replace a previously an-
nounced rule with a new one. If Teague does not apply to a claimed
"inherency" as vague and debatable as that in the present case, then it
applies only to habeas requests for plain overruling.' 10
Penry itself proved to be a deceptive step along the way to
resolving the definitional question in Teague. The result in Penry
may have obscured the potential for that lingering issue in Teague to
become the source of the most, dramatic cutback in federal habeas
jurisdiction in decades. Teague set the stage for the new cases-But-
ler and Parks. Indeed, it set the stage so comprehensively that after
reading the new cases one might wonder why the recent shock over
their results did not occur at the time of Teague. The answer may be
that because the substantive claim in Teague seemed like a new rule
under any definition and because Penry held that the merits issue
there did not involve a new rule, the elusive issue in Teague-the
actual definition of "new rule"-did not receive the focus it de-
served. It certainly did receive focus in the new cases.
III. THE 1990 CASES
A. BUTLER V. MCKELLAR
Butler, a South Carolina death row inmate, went into federal
habeas on a fifth amendment claim on which he had lost on direct
106 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2944.
107 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
108 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945.
109 Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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appeal."' Butler's claim was a variant (how much a variant is the
problem) of the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 12 one of the most impor-
tant post-Miranda cases. Edwards simply held that after a Mirandized
suspect has invoked his right to counsel, the police cannot make any
further attempt to interrogate him, even if they re-Mirandize him;
any further conversation must be at the initiation of the suspect. 113
The variation between Butler's claim and the Edwards rule is simple:
Butler had first been arrested on, and had invoked his right to coun-
sel in, an assault and battery charge, so the question was whether
that invocation barred the police from later questioning him on a
separate murder charge. However much of an expansion that claim
would require from Edwards, the Supreme Court itself had decided
in the defendant's favor on the identical claim in the direct review
case of Arizona v. Roberson,'1 4 handed down after Butler's direct ap-
peals had been exhausted. The question then was whether Roberson
had extended Edwards into a new rule (or less probably, whether, if a
new rule, it would fall into one of the two exceptions Teague had
derived from Justice Harlan's opinions).
Butler thus forced the Court to confront the jurisprudential
morass involved in distinguishing cases dictated by precedent from
those merely "informed" by it. The Court referred back to the
Harlan notion of the purpose of federal habeas jurisdiction, and
concluded that even if, under Roberson, the South Carolina courts
had erred, they had nevertheless acted in good faith; they had not
acted lawlessly." 15 Indeed, as if to underscore its effort at thematic
coherence in its overall criminal jurisprudence, the Rehnquist Court
explicitly linked its decision here to the rather different issue raised
in United States v. Leon. 16 There it had held that even where a po-
liceman violates the fourth amendment, the violation will be ex-
cused-and the exclusionary rule will not apply-if the policeman
acted in good faith on a warrant obtained from a magistrate. 1 7 A
suspect is guaranteed protection from lawless, bad faith behavior,
but a suspect is not necessarily protected from mere violations of
the fourth amendment. The heart of Leon was the assumption that
the exclusionary rule is not a deontological right, but an instrument
designed to monitor police behavior, and thus is subject to cost-
111 Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1990).
112 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
113 Id. at 484-85.
114 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
115 Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
116 Id. at 1217 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); see Butler, 110 S. Ct.
at 1223 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
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benefit analysis.' 18 In Butler the Court asserted, however weak the
analogy, that the same is true of section 2254 in its role in monitor-
ing the state courts.11 9
Butler's lawyers cannot be blamed for their rather simple argu-
ment that the very language of the Court in Roberson would seem to
belie the view that Roberson announced a new rule. 120 The rather
typical rhetoric of the Roberson majority had stressed that the deci-
sion there was dictated by Edwards, and indeed the lawyers for Ari-
zona implicitly conceded much of that point by casting their
argument more as a request for an exception from Edwards than as a
warning against an expansion of it.121 One also must admire the
candor of the majority in Butler, which said, in effect, "Don't be so
literal. We always say that sort of thing."'122 After all, Roberson had
acknowledged that the lower courts had split on the separate-crime
Miranda issue. 123 That was enough to establish that the ruling in the
defendant's favor was a new rule. 124 And the Roberson rule hardly
qualified under either of the Harlan exceptions. 125 Indeed, the
irony of Butler's claim is that, in terms of the second exception, it
was quite the opposite of the model of a claim bearing on factual
innocence. Rather, and one wonders if this motivated the Court, it
was essentially the kind of fifth amendment claim which the Court
had once hinted it would treat like fourth amendment claims-that
is, as essentially unworthy of being raised at all under Stone.
126
B. SAFFLE V. PARKS
If Butler raised one paradigmatic federal claim that had vexed
the issue of federal habeas-the Miranda claim that had just barely
escaped the fate of fourth amendment claims in Stone-Parks, an
Oklahoma death row prisoner, raised the other paradigm in the
companion habeas retroactivity case-a highly nuanced claim under
Lockett. 127 The Oklahoma jury that sentenced him to death was in-
118 Id. at 907-25.
119 Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
120 Id.
121 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988).
122 Somewhat more euphemistically than the imaginary language in the text, Chief
Justice Rehnquist said, "Courts frequently view their decisions as being 'controlled' or
'governed' by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable contrary conclusions
reached by other courts." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1218.
125 Id.
126 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.




structed that it must "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment,
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when imposing sen-
tence."' 128 The Court had probably thought it had dispensed with
this sort of Lockett subtlety after California v. Brown, 129 but it had un-
derestimated just how subtle Lockett claims can get, and how persis-
tent the defense bar is in resisting any formalism in the sentencing
process that relieves the jurors of their responsibility for a visceral
choice over sentence.'
30
Parks's jury was allowed to hear any mitigating evidence prof-
fered by the defense, and it was not explicitly instructed to give less
than full respect to any mitigating evidence it found evocative.
131
Parks argued, however, that the jury might construe this version of
the anti-sympathy instruction as requiring it to suppress any inclina-
tions toward mercy which might depend on mitigating evidence that
did not bear on culpability for the crime. 132 If that were true, the
instruction might violate Lockett. Or, more relevantly, whatever the
merits of the claim, it would track Lockett so closely that a ruling in
Parks's favor would not constitute a new rule under Teague.133 The
Court, however, characterized Parks's claim somewhat differently-
sufficiently differently that it could treat it as a call for a new rule. It
treated it as precisely the kind of claim it rejected the same day in
another case, Boyde v. California,'3 4 and had been discouraging in
other guises elsewhere: the claim that no matter how systematically
and equitably the state sentencing procedure arranges for the com-
parative balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury
128 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259.
129 479 U.S. 538 (1987). Brown rejected an eighth amendment claim to ajury instruc-
tion that had told death penalty jurors to avoid "mere sentiment, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, or public feeling" in their decision. Id. at 542. Presumably, Brown did not
settle Parks's claim in the state's favor because in Brown the Court held the instruction
could not reasonably be construed as limiting consideration of all mitigating evidence,
while Parks argued that his instruction could be so construed. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1263.
130 For years after Lockett, defendants argued that penalty jurors were entitled to, and
indeed were required to, receive explicit reminders that no matter the formula for
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they could not choose death over
life unless they made a normative moral decision that death was appropriate. See
Ledewitz, The Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty
Statute, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 103 (1982). These arguments represented a considerable
stretch beyond earlier Supreme Court case law rejecting any "automatic death penalty."
This line of argument was essentially rejected by the Court this term in Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990), and Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990).
131 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259.
132 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1263.
133 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the narrower version of Parks's claim
was the accurate one, so Parks was not calling for any new rule at all. Id. at 1265 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
134 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1196 (1990).
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must be told that no matter the outcome of that balancing proce-
dure, it can or must still make the independent, subjective decision
whether the defendant deserves to die.
That the Court continues to get vexed by these post-Lockett
claims simply indicates that it is sowing what it had reaped in Lockett
itself, in that case's awkward relation to Furman and Gregg. But while
the Court was fending off one substantive version of this claim in
Boyde, it was taking a different approach at discouraging it here:
right or wrong, Parks's view of the statute constituted a new rule,
and federal habeas petitioners like Parks cannot call for new rules.
Lockett was about admission of mitigating evidence. Parks's claim was,
contrary to his own characterization of it, about processing of mitigat-
ing evidence, and that was a bright enough line upon which the
Court could rely. 13 5 Put differently, a lower court would not be act-
ing in illogic or bad faith to hold that Lockett does not dictate this
result. In language that reaches exquisite nuance in finessing the
issue of whether a federal court would ever admit to making, as op-
posed to discovering, law, the Court explained that at best Lockett
might be said to "inform, or even control, or govern" it.136 And as
for the two Harlan exceptions, Parks was left with precisely the argu-
ment that the Court could not accept because accepting it would
undermine the very point of these habeas cases: the argument that
any claim that could reasonably affect the outcome of the penalty
trial was at least the moral equivalent of a claim of factual innocence
and was, quite obviously, so crucial to the case as to demand a
hearing. 137
135 The brightness of that line is blurred, ironically, by the one major prodefendant
case handed down this term, indeed on the same day as Parks, Butler, and Boyde. In
McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), the Court reversed a death sentence
and invalidated a key part of a state statute because the state unconstitutionally required
a unanimous finding of any mitigating circumstance before that circumstance could
enter into the final weighing decision. McKoy is arguably about processing, not admis-
sion, and one can find language in the McKoy opinion that traces the holding ineluctably
back to Lockett. However one reads the hyper-subtlety of these Lockett cases, the Court in
Parks was showing remarkable confidence in claiming to distinguish new post-Lockett
rules from mere applications.
136 Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1261. The Court had a bit more difficulty explaining why Parks
was asking for a new rule where Penry had not been. But the Court insisted that Penry's
case was indeed about admitting, not processing evidence. Id. at 1261-62.
137 Id. at 1263-64.
The point was only confirmed by another decision handed down near the end of the
last Term. In Sawyer v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4905 (U.S. June 21, 1990) (No. 89-5809),
the Court held that its decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), was a
"new rule" under Teague. In Caldwell, the Court found an eighth amendment violation
where the prosecutor had told the sentencingjury that any death verdict it handed down
would be reviewed by higher courts. The Court held that such "reassurance" under-
mined the reliability of death sentencing by diminishing the sentencer's sense of respon-
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IV. EPILOG: THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL HABEAS
The new cases may well enable the lower federal courts to avoid
facing vexing marginal questions in constitutional criminal proce-
dure. Whether they actually will reduce the district courts' habeas
dockets is less clear. Presumably, the defense bar will soon become
expert in a new rhetoric of pleading, treating death row federal
claims as being "dictated by" earlier cases, denouncing the state
courts for faithless disloyalty to settled precedent, and congratulat-
ing themselves on the very modesty of their claims.' 38 This rhetoric
will, of course, cause defendants some consistency problems be-
cause it would seem to contradict the sort of rhetoric they will need
to convince the Supreme Court that their claims are of such central
legal importance as to be worthy of certiorari, either on direct re-
view before the section 2254 plea or later, after the federal habeas
claim is rejected by both the district and circuit courts. Otherwise,
in trying to circumvent the sinkhole of the "new rule" rule, petition-
ers may scurry to find previously undiscovered factual evidence
bearing on innocence or mercy, so that they can avoid having their
legal claims called "legal" in the first place.
Nevertheless, the district courts will not be hearing the sorts of
claims to which they have become all too used. Especially in circuits
covering states that have had few or no executions, the legal picture
will change. Federal courts that might have felt compelled or in-
clined to hear fairly basic structural attacks on the statutes will be
telling petitioners that their claims belong--or belonged-in the
state courts or directly in the Supreme Court. To the extent that
federal habeas in these states has become a kind of class-action law-
suit leading to injunctive relief against the state death penalty sys-
sibility for its act. Petitioner Sawyer, a Lousiana inmate sought to invoke Caldwell in his
federal habeas claim, but the Court held that Caldwell, though it had found "general
support" in earlier eighth amendment cases, nevertheless had not been a "predictable
development" that state courts should have been expected to foresee. Though the gen-
eral principle of reliability in sentencing had been established at least as far back as
Lockett, to hold that Caldwell was therefore not a new rule would make the test meaning-
lessly general. Id. at 4907. Moreover, as for the Teague exceptions, the Court flatly re-
jected as proving far too much, the argument that Caldwell qualified for an exception
because it was designed to improve the accuracy of the trial decision. The Court
stressed that the new rule must also meet the "watershed" test of being fundamentally
necesssary to the trial. Id. at 4909.
138 The two new "meta-rules" of federal habeas might be called Catch 22 and Catch
22A. Catch 22 is that a new rule is not cognizable on habeas unless it is so new as to be
one of the last remaining unrecognized watersheds. Catch 22A is that a petitioner may
suffer a procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), unless his
"cause" for default is that he did not anticipate a new intervening constitutional ruling,
in which case that ruling may be a "new rule" to which he is not entitled under the new
cases.
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tem,13 9 the action will change venues, or collapse in failure, or both.
On the other hand, if the Court believes that the new cases will
get the federal courts out of the general business of creating new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure, it may merely have
shifted the pressure back to itself-on direct review. Certainly, the
issues abound, and though the political dynamics of the death pen-
alty are unclear, the defense bar will now redirect its calls for consti-
tutional innovation to the state courts. As Justice Stevens himself
argued, 140 the Court has failed to address the complex relationship
between the general theme of factual innocence as the criterion of
cognizable claims, and the somewhat inapposite category of claims
of "sentencing innocence"-that is, claims that may have affected
the jurors' decision as to the propriety of the death sentence where
the claims do not bear directly on the defendant's culpability for the
crime. This version of "harmless error" has always been one of the
conceptual knots in death penalty law.
The problem is not limited to the death penalty. The notion
that there is a hierarchy of constitutional claims, with the most fun-
damental being those bearing on factual innocence, has always been
intellectually suspect, since it would carve out of some types of fed-
eral jurisdiction claims sufficiently important that the Burger-Rehn-
quist Courts have felt them worthy of certiorari, even where the
results have been against the defendants. Some of these rules have
dealt with crucial elements of trial practice and advocacy that do not
bear directly on factual innocence, but rather on the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel which, because of the symbolic centrality of
the lawyer-client relationship, seems to deserve a high place in any
morally coherent hierarchy. 14 1 A related category consists of those
claims that deal on the very borderline between the category of
claims the Court has almost excluded from federal habeas alto-
gether, yet at the same time invoke these same vital concerns about
the lawyer-client relationship.
142
139 E.g., Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (substantially invalidating
Arizona statute).
140 For a discussion of'Justice Stevens's opinion in Teague, see supra text accompanying
notes 97-102.
141 E.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (no violation of right to counsel when
defense lawyer refuses to participate in client perjury); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1
(1983) (no sixth amendment violation where court denied continuance to enable origi-
nal public defender to rejoin defense team).
142 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (no sixth amendment violation where po-
lice do not inform suspect that attorney retained by third party was trying to reach him);
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (fifth amendment bars state psychiatrist from testi-
fying about penalty phase when defendant did not receive Miranda rights at interview);
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But the possibility remains that the Court has achieved its less
explicit goal: to simply block the opportunities for death row in-
mates to win late and successful stays of execution by filing plausi-
ble, legally novel, successive habeas petitions. The irony is that the
new cases have come down simultaneously with a parallel legal de-
velopment aimed at curbing the same perceived abuse.
Shortly after he was elevated, Chief Justice Rehnquist created
the "Powell Committee" to devise some fair means of combating
the wasteful protraction of multiple habeas petitions in death cases,
and, last year, the Committee offered up a proposal to the courts
and Congress. 143 The Committee's report proposed a complex
compromise: it would solve the problem of multiple federal habeas
petitions by essentially limiting each death row inmate to one bite at
the federal apple, subject to one crucial qualification and one crucial
exception. The qualification concerned legal representation.
Though death row inmates are guaranteed state-paid lawyers at trial
and on direct appeal, in the often overlooked phase of state collat-
eral proceedings, they are often left to the charity of the local de-
fense bar or private anti-death penalty organizations. The Powell
proposal would tell the states that if they want to benefit from the
new restriction of death row federal claims to one habeas petition,
they must, in exchange, set up a system for paid and competent rep-
resentation in state habeas corpus proceedings.' 44 Consistently
with his own opinion in Stone, Justice Powell tried to tell the states
that if they can fulfill some minimal level of "full and fair proce-
dure," they can save themselves a lot of trouble in federal court.1
45
Conversely, the Powell proposal would require the defendant
to file his federal habeas petition within six months of a certain fixed
deadline, and would limit the defendant to one federal petition, sub-
ject to a key exception. 46 In extraordinary circumstances-the de-
fendant discovers a new claim not yet presented in any court
because it is based on a new constitutional principle declared retro-
active to claimants on collateral review or because it is based on
newly discovered and not previously available evidence, and it bears
on factual innocence-the federal court might just barely consider
granting him a second hearing.
147
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no Gideon right to counsel on discretionary
appeals).
143 Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (1989).
144 Id. at 3241-42.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 3244-45.
147 Id. at 3245.
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The current fate of the Powell proposal tells us something
about judicial sensitivity to the Rehnquist effort to restrict the
habeas process. It may also tell us something about the complexity
of the political dynamics of crime and law in America. The public
wants executions, and it elects legislators and indirectly chooses
judges who are increasingly likely to satisfy it. Yet something in the
institutional culture of the courts and of the congressional judiciary
committees resists what is perceived to be a wholesale revision of
the inherent screening and filtering mechanics of the system. A few
months after the report was formally issued, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
was rebuffed not only by the legislators for whom the report was
intended, but also by the Judicial Conference of the United States
itself, whose panel of circuit chiefjudges amended or tried to amend
the proposal to gut some of its key recommendations.148 The Con-
ference insisted on putting some substance behind what it otherwise
considered the empty promise of "competent" representation de-
manded of the state systems; it would require the states to provide
competent lawyers at every state court phase-from the very first
trial onward. 149 Moreover, the amended proposal would essentially
adopt Justice Stevens' view that a challenge to the propriety of the
death sentence was indeed the moral and legal equivalent of a claim
of factual innocence.' 50 One of the proposed amendments, which
failed on a tie vote only by virtue of the Chief Justice's own vote,
would, ironically, have overturned Butler and Parks.15 1
The new stalemate means that we may now have the worst of all
worlds: death row inmates can still pursue multiple habeas peti-
tions, but the petitions will likely leave state proceedings untouched.
The Great Writ will continue to manifest itself in reams of pleading
paper, but it will probably cease to be the instrument of constitu-
tional idealism, nor will the rationalization of some of its liberal
apologists-its role in "dialectical federalism"1 52 -have any further
force. The constriction on federal habeas may give the country the
rate of executions it wants-or thinks it wants. If that happens, the




151 Id. The resistance to the ChiefJustice's proposal may derive from a generational
and -political conflict. The Chief Judges of the circuit courts are senior jurists, and a
disproportionate number of them-as compared to the federal bench generally-are
pre-Reagan or Democratic appointees.
152 Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ.
1035 (1977) (arguing that section 2254 ensured a "conversation" between the state and
federal courts on constitutional values).
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result may be some social perception that the courts are implement-
ing-or at least are no longer obstructing-the populist desire for
combating violent crime in America. In any event, the federal
courts, to the extent that they truly feel swamped by a death docket
that they perceive to be tangential to their true judicial mission, may
find some relief. If, as is possible, none of these results follow, we
will have learned some lessons about the illusion of social engineer-
ing through doctrinal manipulation.
